Re: More future history questions

G'day,

> Heh! That's excellent, Beth - what were their reactions when told it 
> was a game background, and can you remember any specific comments 
> that any of them made while discussing it, as to any particular bits 
> that were more or less plausible than others? That kind of feedback 
> from a bunch of "experts" in the field could be very useful......  ;-)

Over all they generally had two views, one "good", one "bad" for how
each region might end up. It usually hinged on some key assumptions. 

It was back in July so only have vague recollections now, but to sum up
what I remember the membership of many of the power groups was about
right in their estimation, though how they came about was often
questioned ;)

IC - They were of the opinion that a strong ASEAN alliance/economic bloc
is very possible, especially in response to a stronger China. Originally
China would be on board, but if they really do dam the Mekong and other
southeast asian waters then they would be going it alone (and many of
the continental southeast asian nations could be in serious trouble
pinched between dwindling freshwater and saltwater inundation of coastal
deltas). It partly comes down to how easily IC gets through its current
multiethnic tensions and past previous corrupt practices (many of which
are already turning around). It basically comes down to power gradients,
at the present "shit flows downhill" so to speak and Indonesians get
pushed into illegal activities in Australian waters because they are
being pushed form the south, if the area stabilises or the pressure
gradient shifts they cold see movement north again ($250+ million people
is a lot to fit on such tiny islands).

IF - That really came down to what emerged from the last years worth of
events, at one point of the triangle you got a coalition/federation of
some form of modern at least quasi-democratic states, at another chaos
and at the third strong religious leadership. One guy thought that
empowerment of women would lead to widespread change, just as it has in
the west. There was a lot of argument about how likely it was, with as
many people pointing out how unlikely it seemed in the past in the west.
There was no good resolution on that front.... it came down more to past
cultural practice for each region and whether the post Mohammed
teachings would be weakened in the same way the post Bible rules have in
Christianity. Its always enlightening to compare what a holy book
actually says vs how old bearded men interpreted it after the fact ;)

OU - They could see a Pacific without Australia in an ASEAN based power
bloc, in which case absorbing NZ and the larger Pacific Islands made
sense (the smaller ones will be underwater and already have their
governments largely based in Australia/NZ already). They questioned
whether the trade ties would be with Japan or China, but basically the
same thing (kinda). The alternative was Australia becoming much more
Asian in alliances, outlook, population etc (investment wise we are
already a significant Chinese holding so to speak). They did think
conflict of resources (i.e. Australia fighting others off) may be a
significant concern in the future... especially when the government
realises it sold the whole reserve and left nothing for us....

UN - they didn't think it stood significant chance of being a power in
its own right while still being dependent on member contributions

RH - while they couldn't see a Tsar at its head come hell or high water
the actual make up of the hegemony didn't really phase them, beyond
dropping at least some of Russia, more just including the eastern edges
of it and maybe also picking up some of the other east european nations.

PAU - they saw this as having a lot of potential, it was more the
details of how dynamic it was they argued about, some saw it growing
with demography to be significant, others saw the spectre of aids and
poverty dragging on. The key there seemed to be whether ngos/governments
continued to just "give" them things (like irrigation systems) vs
teaching them how to do it for themselves (most aid projects are
derelict in a few years as no one was taught to do the maintenance and
parts can be hard to get). On the other hand if they had local education
supported and local leadership then it could become quite strong. More
than half thought the later would occur given African peacekeepers are
now most active in African affairs and progress is being seen on the
ground. They did think that transition could get rocky in spots however

NAC - though many could see the US weakened they didn't see it
completely fall, at least so quickly, though they had some fairly harsh
things to say about the state of education and quantitative skill base
vs demand and the potential for radical views to derail things even if
the majority don't really support them. For instance they pointed to how
an isolationist like approach post 2001 has seen an erosion of the
number of foreign scientists seeking/finding employment in the US and
the implications for their R&D base. As to the rest of the NAC, well
they thought south America would be a power bloc in its own right (at
least eventually) and that while they cold see the UK leaving the EU
(remembering this was even before the latest debt tensions) they saw
them turning to a US or commonwealth trade based alliance (so a cross
Atlantic alliance, a bit like the NAC in composition in some aspects,
but with a different means of coming about).

ESU - While they saw the 3 component powers flexing muscles and
reshaping borders they didn't see it as one huge unit any time soon.
They especially didn't see India taking on Chinese rule, though they
could see them with trade links or negotiating over how to carve up the
neighbours. It kind of came down to whether each one ended up weak or
strong as a result of their industrialisation and the development of a
middle class. Russia they thought could potentially pick up some of the
central asian countries, but not much beyond that at least in the middle
term.

FSE and NSL - they could see smaller parts of the EU survive even if the
whole didn't, though they tended to see it more as "rich countries stick
together" (i.e. France/Germany) and "the less well to do get the boot"
(so Italy, Greece, Spain all in individual heaps... maybe not that
inclined to band together as not a lot to offer each other beyond more
debts... though that could be too short term focused). They could also
see the Scandinavians sitting back and watching safely from a distance
as they dealt with their own social and environmental issues.

Cheers

Beth