Re: [GZG] Armoured utility vehicles and IEDs in SG/DS

John Atkinson wrote:
> Detailed information about IED effects on US vehicles is generally
> S/REL AUS, GB.  Anyone who knows, can't talk about it.  Anyone who
> talks about it, knows anecdotal data or nothing at all but what he's
> seen on the news (ie, anecdotal data).
>
> John M. Atkinson
> SSG, USA
> Counter-IED Trainer, Task Force Troy
>   
Oh good, something I can talk about, knowing nothing apart from the 
basic theory. No NTK.

In the SimTerror05 exercise, one of the things I came up with was to 
give all mobile phones in a cell a 3-ring call. Either on command, or 
randomly. It would add a certain element of risk to the use of some of 
the less sophisticated, cheaply and easily made devices. A cell-phone 
jammer would also be useful, as would ELINT about where calls are coming

from. FLIR imaging and some of the higher frequency radars would help 
spot things too. Not all, but it reduces the odds. Something to induce 
currents in nearby wires might also be useful. Things to  give spurious 
signals to garage-door openers ditto.

Continuous surveillance of roadworks might help. A buried 152mm shell 
can ruin your whole day, especially if used as an initiator for 
something larger.

HUMINT remains one of the more effective weapons in most scenarios. 
Careful observation ditto. The real trick is not to cause a premature 
detonation, but defuse and do some forensics on the device. Try to get 
some Darwinian selection going, then go after the few remaining expert 
bomb-makers, keep them on the move etc. If they get to plant an IED on a

known approach route, you've already lost  half the battle.

How well this theory accords with practice, I have no idea. And those 
who do know can't say. Probably mostly right in some areas, wildly wrong

(or at least impractical) in others.

Zoe

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