Re: [FT] Battlecruisers vs. battleships

At 01:31  16/05/02 -0700, Eric wrote:
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Richard and Emily Bell" <rlbell@sympatico.ca>
>To: <gzg-l@csua.berkeley.edu>
>Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 7:50 PM
>Subject: Re: [FT] Battlecruisers vs. battleships
>
>
> > The results of the Bismark's fire on the Hood give credence to the
notion
>that
> > the Hood was inadequitely protected, but analysis of the events
shows that
>it
> > was an improbable hit that caused her loss.
>
>That may be true... except for the fact that the three battlecruisers
that
>were sunk at Jutland were destroyed in pretty much exactly the same
way:
>weak armor that got hit in the wrong place, causing a catastrophic
magazine
>explosion.

It is important to remember that before the outbreak of WWI, even though

the cannon used had ranges measured in miles it was expected that the 
protagonists would approach to close range and batter each other much
like 
naval ships had done previously. Although the capability was there, 
tradition and a view of "how it should be" determined how people
expected 
the navies to fight.

Of course once hostilities broke out the ships started firing at each
other 
as soon as they were in range, completely at odds with how it was
supposed 
to be.

>If Hood had been the only example, it could've been passed off as a
freak
>case.	However, it wasn't, and as Jutland and the Hood are the only two
>serious examples of battlecruisers engaging battleships in naval
actions
>(that I know of),

Dogger Bank, which precedes Jutland. Basically the war in the North Sea
(as 
far as the two fleets were concerned) was a series of attempts by the 
Germans on one hand trying to draw out the larger British fleet and 
hopefully defeat them in detail. While on the other hand the British
were 
busy trying to catch the Germans at it.

>that basically puts the occurence rate of such disasters
>at 100%.  Which, in turn, doesn't suggest that the sort of hit required
to
>do this is that improbable at all.

That's if the losses of the battlecruisers at Jutland and the Hood
occurred 
for the same reason, which they didn't.

The Hood was lost because it was subjected to plunging fire, at long
range, 
which penetrated the thinner top armour. As I have indicated the
designers 
of these ships envisaged fighting at closer ranges and designed the
armour 
protection accordingly.

The losses at Jutland were due to a completely different reason. The 
British crews in order to produce a high rate of fire had charge  bags 
stacked within the turret ready for use unlike the German crews who
didn't 
do this. The German ship's also had closed anti-flash doors on the 
elevators carrying the ammunition from the magazine below to the turret 
unlike the British ships.

So when a German shell penetrated a turret on a British BC it ignited
the 
charge bags, the resultant flash in turn ignited the ammunition in the 
magazine below as there was no closed anti-flash door to prevent this.
Of 
course the result was disaster.

Much as been made about the thin Battlecruiser armour but it wasn't the 
armour which failed the battlecruisers at Jutland, it was dangerous
gunnery 
practises and the lack of closed anti-flash doors The German ships
didn't 
stack charge bags at hand, instead feeding them up from the magazine as 
required with a elevator with anti-flash doors that weren't left open.
They 
also suffered hits which penetrated and knocked out their turrets but
not 
with the same catastrophic results.

As a note the British gunnery practise (stacking the charge bags, to
assist 
in achieving a	high rate of fire) was the result of peace time gunnery 
training. So there's a lesson here, train as you intend to fight. The 
British crews went into battle using dangerous practises

Cheers

Derek

Derek Fulton
12 Balaka st.
Rosny, Hobart.
Tasmania,  7018.
Australia

Phone; (03) 62459123
Mobile; 0438459123
Email; derekfulton@bigpond.com