Re: Discussion topic - rewriting (future) history....?

>G'day,
>
>I'd say my one and only real bugbear about the futureverse is that 
>the IF and NI have to be so focused at each other's throats. Freed 
>from such close quarters you could imagine a diversification of 
>tensions. This is a problem I have with many "future histories" 
>across many different fiction sources where long term combatants on 
>Earth transfer without pause into space. I know that there are 
>plenty of cases where there have been centuries of history between 
>two "nations" but geography plays a decent part to that.
>
>However, this is not a reason to change anything though because 
>there is enormous scope to paint the existing timeline in a vast 
>number of ways. As a bit of fun years back I wrote a version up with 
>a few more details that caste a different light to the commonly held 
>view on the same events. I won't bother reposting here as it raised 
>a few hackles at the time, but it was meant to be one example of the 
>many many ways you can caste the current GZGverse timeline. In all I 
>think that's a strength. In fact a geopolitical adviser friend of 
>mine was quite intrigued to hear it was written when it was, given 
>things have panned out since. He was very interested in it.
>
>A more moderate whinge is I'm coming to the end of my Mars timeline 
>of stories (I've just about kicked the KV back off Mars... I hope to 
>finish that this summer) so it'd be nice to know how the humans 
>eventually kicked the KV butt in total (or whether the KV just 
>dwindled away for their own reasons like the Mongol horde) so I 
>don't end up too off base ;)
>
>Lets start the second Xeno war! ;)
>
>Beth

Hey Beth, thanks for posting these - very interesting, if you have 
any more then please let us see them! As you say, some of it is 
scarily close to some of the things in the GZG-verse.....

Actually I'd like it if you DID re-post your own piece that you 
mentioned above, just for discussion - though if you think it might 
upset  some folks then feel free to email it to me off-list instead. 
I do like to HOPE that we are all grown-up enough on here that we can 
read other peoples' ideas and opinions without throwing our toys out 
of the pram!  ;-)

Best,

Jon (GZG)

>
>P.S. In case anyone is interested here are two example geopolitical 
>sketches/scenarios drawn up recently by some advisers as context for 
>some modelling work Im doing in Australia. This is pretty indicative 
>of the kind of broad brush strokes used in that realm, so you can 
>see Jon isn't too far off the mark in the way he does thing
>
>>>>>  WATER CRISIS IN SE ASIA <<<<<<<
>
>Water demand is growing fast across Asia, as large populations there 
>continue to grow, both in terms of population numbers, but also via 
>industrial expansion. This could potentially lead to tension as 
>China is already water poor, with changes in the regional climate 
>contracting the water supply (from Himalayan meltwater and monsoons) 
>and making it more variable. Chinas desire for control of its water 
>supply is evident in the many water redirection plans and the 
>buffering infrastructure that have been built over the last 2000 
>years (the Grand Canal project began in 16BC). China controls the 
>headwaters of many of the major rivers which feed India, Bangladesh, 
>and SE Asia. This means that Chinese decisions have significant 
>potential to shape stability in the region.
>
>Possibly the best outcome for the region is if all the nations in 
>the region agree to basin wide sharing and allocation of water, 
>while simultaneously becoming more efficient in their use of water 
>(e.g. by adapting their agriculture to use less water). The more 
>likely business as usual trajectory is that China continues to 
>steadily divert more water from SE Asia into water poor regions of 
>China, though they would likely refrain from redirecting waters 
>destined for the sub-continent for diplomatic and security reasons 
>(as India is perhaps too big an enemy to make and Pakistan is 
>currently too good a friend). While the impacted SE Asian nations 
>could moderate the effects of reduced water availability by 
>increasing efficiency and adapting industrial practices it is still 
>likely to increase tenions (especially with Vietnam). The worst 
>outcome would come if China aggressively diverted water from all the 
>headwaters to its parched east. This would lead to significant 
>tensions between China and both India and Vietnam. Any war with 
>India over water could have devastating implications, including the 
>possibility of a nuclear exchange. Tension of this kind would not 
>only be devastating for those directly involved, but the ensuing 
>instability would affects Australias trade and border security 
>(massively increasing people movement and illegal immigration 
>pressures) as well as leading to changed trade conditions and 
>productivity.
>
>
>>>>>  POTENTIAL UNIFICATION OF THE MUSLIM WORLD <<<<<<<<<<
>
>As seen in the tumultuous activities of 2010-2011 there are many 
>pressures driving for change in middle eastern and African nations, 
>including fast growing populations with millions of unemployed youth 
>(and education gaps), a rejection of modernism and the West (which 
>has been tainted by its support for local dictators). This has 
>provided an opportunity for many different unifying concepts to be 
>put forward, some democratic, some based on the religious ideal of 
>the caliphate and many antithetical to western powers. At present it 
>is unclear what form of government will ultimately emerge from the 
>upheavals of the Arab Spring. Democratic movements are only one 
>faction represented in the revolutions, with the Muslim Brotherhood 
>(and similar organisations) typically much better organised than the 
>democrats and on-going tension and struggle between Shia and Sunni 
>interests. It is possible that a single unifying form of rule could 
>extend from Maghreb, to the Middle East, Pakistan and Indonesia in 
>the east and the Sub-Sahara (e.g. Nigeria etc) in the south. The 
>presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan (and potential weapons 
>programs in Iran) could exacerbate nervousness of nations like 
>Israel regarding the outcome of the revolutions. At one extreme 
>Israel and the USA may take decisive (and early) action to 
>neutralize the nuclear threat, while simultaneously preventing 
>accommodation between Shia and Sunni interests and supporting key 
>oil producing Arab states so that they do not fall into any 
>caliphate. At the other extreme is the scenario where most Muslim 
>states come together in the caliphate, with a nuclear exchange 
>between Israel and Iran disrupting global oil production; 
>anti-Muslim sentiment leading to pre-emptive suppression of Muslim 
>minorities in China, Russia and Europe. The later situation could 
>degrade further if it leads to military conflict; for instance, if 
>Pakistan collapses the USA may feel compelled to take surgical 
>action to secure the Pakistanis nuclear stockpile, potentially 
>ending in a standoff with India if they also attempt to secure 
>Pakistans stockpile, the resulting posturing could see India take 
>more territory in Kashmir, securing territory in Afghanistan and 
>ending up in a further stand-off with China (who may feel compelled 
>to support Pakistan and enter Afghanistan against India). A more 
>middle of the road business as usual scenario is that not all Muslim 
>states fall and only a caliphate of sorts forms, which does not 
>include all of the key oil producers, Israel my still take out 
>Iranian nuclear facilities and Pakistan may still suffer at least 
>partial collapse, particularly in the north where large bandit 
>regions of Taliban may form. However, it would be a much more 
>heterogeneous outcome than envisaged for either of the other, more 
>extreme, scenarios.