Re: [GZG] Small thought re: Orbital Assault
From: John Atkinson <johnmatkinson@g...>
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2005 18:35:35 +0100
Subject: Re: [GZG] Small thought re: Orbital Assault
On 11/24/05, Oerjan Ariander <oerjan.ariander@telia.com> wrote:
> >That had to do with the physical geography.
>
> If all that matters had been physical geography, you could've landed
> directly at Basra and saved yourselves a lot of marching through the
> desert. If the Iraqi defences there were unable to interfere, why
didn't
> you do that? :-)
Because the port at Basra was not conducive to being a proper
logistical base until it was secure. There were secure ports
available within a short march of the Iraqi border. On a colony
planet this is unlikely to be the case.
The nearest analogy might be Normandy, where the beaches were selected
for their physical characteristics, and a temporary port was erected.
The plan didn't call for it to be a main logistical hub as long as it
was, only the stubborn German defenses forced it to be used longer
than the plan intended.
> >At which point the Rebels were screwed. Not precisely the best
> >planetary defense plan if you mean to hold the system. I'm still
> >unclear on how, other than handwaving, the Rebels managed to evacuate
> >the planet coming from a known location on the surface.
>
> By having a planet-based weapons battery powerful enough to at least
> temporarily disable a Star Destroyer with a single hit clear the
would-be
> blockading units out of the way. (We only see one SD disabled in this
way
> on-screen, but since the gun kept firing throughout the evacuation it
is
> probably safe to assume that Vader tried to close the gap thus
opened.)
Couldn't fighters have maneuvered in to smash the damn things? I
doubt the ion cannon would have been able to hit them. Oh, well.
Nuance.
In my opinion, planetary defenses will be about as common as large
coastal fortresses were in European colonial posessions in the
Americas. In other words, the major ports and that is about it. And
not even a lot of them.
> > >>Because of the difficulty of logistical support,
> > >>there was practically no armored support availible.
> > >
> > >The lack of armoured support in the Falklands had at least as much
to do
> > >with the terrain as with the logistics. Even if the Brits had been
able to
> > >get MBTs ashore, they wouldn't have been able to drive very far
without
> > >running major risks of bogging down. The light vehicles they did
use were
> > >far better suited to the terrain - and since the Argies didn't have
> > >anything heavier to oppose them with, they were sufficient to do
the job.
> >
> >Eh, even a few more trucks, never mind some more helicopters,
>
> You were talking about ARMOURED support above. Generally speaking,
trucks
Oerjan, dammit, do you need it spelled out in words of one syllable?
I was conceeding that point.
While maintaining that transportation difficulties still limited the
British forces to a fraction of the effectiveness they would have had
with a more robust logistical system.
> Like I said, even if the Brits had been able to put a serious armoured
> force on the Falklands they would've had severe difficulties to use
them -
> unless they by some miracle had managed to land them within firing
range of
> Port Stanley... but I don't think that even the US would've been able
to
> pull *that* off :-/
I think after an American carrier group or two worked over the
Argentinian Navy and Air Force, we would have done precisely as we
pleased. We also would have had more than a handful of helos, and air
assaulted all over the place.
John
--
"Thousands of Sarmatians, Thousands of Franks, we've slain them again
and again. We're looking for thousands of Persians."
--Vita Aureliani
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