Re: [GZG] [DSII] Precision Strike
From: Oerjan Ariander <oerjan.ariander@t...>
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2005 17:13:50 +0200
Subject: Re: [GZG] [DSII] Precision Strike
John Atkinson wrote:
>>Oh, certainly. 'Course, those army strike assets would also have been
in
>>range of the *Serbian* army strike assets which the combined air
forces
>>were trying to hit from higher than 15,000' altitude ;-)
>
>Do the Serbs have anything now or then which could play footsie with
>an ATACMS?
Not ATACMS (165 km range), but MLRS only reaches 32km (at least
according
to the unclassified FM <g>) which is very nearly within range of the
longest-ranged WP and South African howitzers. I don't know if Serbia
had
any such howitzers at the time of the Kosovo crisis, but it wouldn't
surprise me at all - the various ex-Yugo states bought massive amounts
of
weapons from abroad during the post-break-up wars.
The Serbs also had their own MLR systems firing DPICM rockets; and
although
the ones I have any range data for (the M77) is rather shorter-ranged
than
the MLRS (only ~20km) it looks pretty much like any other truck until it
fires, so it might be able to sneak into range as well - not even the US
could afford to shoot at every single enemy truck before it got within
20km
of the FEBA :-/
>I'd also question whether they have CBR capable of figuring out
>where that MLRS strike is coming from before they packed up and moved.
I'd expect the Serbs to have a pretty good idea about where the MLRSs
even
*before* they fired, and that *without* using any CBRs... it's not as if
the NATO would've been the only ones with observers on the ground, after
all ;-)
>At the very least it would have made the tactical questions more
>complex.
Indeed. It would also have made the *political* questions far more
complex
for the *alliance*, which was why it didn't happen - you only want to
increase the complexity of the *enemy's* questions, not of your own :-/
>>It would also have added another interesting facet to this AA-vs-ARM
ECM
>>warfare: creating *false* AA radar emissions to make the NATO
>>forces waste their MLRS/ATACMS on cheap decoys [...]
>
>And here we have the fundamental problem with any single-arm approach
>to ANYTHING. Without eyes on the ground, properly trained eyes with
>the right gear, strike assets, be they precision or otherwise, can be
>spoofed.
Yep. For that matter even eyes on the ground can be spoofed if they
don't
have enough time to check the target out up close - some of those
Serbian
decoys look very realistic until you get within a hundred meters or so
of them.
>UAVs would have helped in Serbia, but they wouldn't have
>solved the problem, not in that terrain against that foe.
UAVs *were* used in Serbia. USAF Predators, US Army Hunters, USMC
Pioneers,
German and French CL-289s, French Crecerelles, British Phoenixes... and
just as you expected they didn't solve the problem. (Some pilots even
claimed that they *reduced* the number of Serbian tanks killed, since it
took so long to get an UAV to confirm a particular target that the
strike
craft often had to return to refuel before it could get permission to
fire...)
As far as I can tell some 20-25 UAVs were shot down during the Kosovo
crisis (the Serbs claimed 25 UAVs shot down; NATO's UAV units reported
21
lost to enemy fire and 6 lost to "other causes", but I don't know how
complete those reports were) including at least one and possibly more
shot
down by door gunners aboard Serbian MI-8 helicopters. The use of
helicopters for UAV-hunting was stopped when NATO started providing
fighter
cover for their UAVs, though <g>
Later,
Oerjan
oerjan.ariander@telia.com
"Life is like a sewer.
What you get out of it, depends on what you put into it."
-Hen3ry
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