Re: The new US Army APC the "Stinger" (Stryker)

>
>
>>CNN is giving what the Army tells it in this case
>>they quoted 2 million 
>>per copy
>>with a procurement of 2100 and total cost of 4
>>billion. I know the math 
>>doesn't
>>work but I just repeated the numbers as quoted. I
>>assume you trust the 
>>Army's
>>estimates.
>>
>
>Actually, my corrections are direct from the US Army's
>own briefing slides from this press release.  URL
>already provided and repeated below.
>
><CUT OUT>
>
>>>Actually that's not written in stone.  Initial
>>>requirement is 714, for 6 brigade sets eventual
>>>procurement may be 5K plus.	The 2100 figure is for
>>>the entire IAV family. 
>>>
>>So I guess there will not be any reduced cost due to
>>economy of scale.
>>
>
>Initial procurement.  Right now, it's still a big
>question as to how many IBCTs are really needed.
> 
>
>>One of the biggest problems with the Bradley was
>>that due to the cost
>>and that it could only carry half of a squad
>>(require 2 Bradleys per M113
>>replaced) it never completely replace the M113. This
>>was why the US
>>Army needed to reduce the size of  the US Inf.
>>company (the big debate
>>was squads of about 6 men or full squads with 2
>>platoon companies).
>>
>
>Now resolved:	2x9+5=Platoon.	Although this is
>modified by actual manning level and local unit SOP.
> 
>
>>I assume that this vehicle will carry a full squad
>>and may result in 
>>restoring
>>the US Inf. Company to its previous strength.
>>
>
>9 Dismounts.  It would be better to be 11, but 9 ain't
>bad.
>
>http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2001/010517-D-6570D-015.jpg
>
>Like I said, this is the Army's briefing slide for
>this press release.  Read the whole presentation. 
>Might actually know what you're talking about.
>
>
>
>>>No, it's not.  It's a new program.  Try paying
>>>attention to what the Army has been doing for the
>>>
>>past
>>
>>>decade or so before you babble ignorantly.
>>>
>>Actually I stopped following the development
>>programs of the Army after 
>>I got
>>out (of the Army) in 1981. 
>>
>
>In that case, do some research before you criticize. 
>Try looking up the IBCT concept in the first place.
>
>>By the way,  since you seem to know, where is the US
>>Army's LAV?  
>>
>
>I've never seen one.  I believe the program was
>canceled completely.
>
>Since it
>
>>seems as if you are an expert on the Stryker perhaps
>>you could give us 
>>some of
>>the details on the program like when it started and
>>what are the vehicle 
>>specifications.
>>
>
>Read the briefing slides I already cited.
>
>>Actually we did need the LAV but fortunately the
>>Iraq's waited for us to
>>catch up. The Bradley at 25 tons is a very poor
>>candidate for airlift while
>>the LAV25 at 14.5 tons can be carried by any of the
>>air force transport
>>aircraft (C130?). If Iraq hadn't stopped and waited,
>>the Airborne and
>>Light Divisions would have had no effective APC to
>>fight with in a mobile
>>war.
>>
>
>Airborne Divisions are not intended to fight in a
>mobile war.  We didn't send any of our "Light" (10th,
>25th, 7th) Divisions.	Sent 101st, but they have
>
Lets see, the light divisions were formed as a fast reaction force that 
could
be transported in about 2/3 of the airlift as the airborne / airmoble 
divisions.
The only problem was that without APC's the light divisions are not good
for mobile war where artillery becomes extremely dangerous. Sadam's army
during the Gulf war was heavy in artillery. The original talk was to 
have reserve
(or national guard?) units equipped with the LAV that could be attached 
to the
light division and flesh it out for a mobile war. As a side light the 
Tiger brigade
(Ft Knox training cadre?) was attached to the Marines to give them more
firepower in the Gulf war.

>
>Blackhawks (You may not have heard of them, I'm not
>
The only problem with the Blackhawk or the UH-1 is that if you do not 
control
the air then they get to play a new game "duck or die" (The quote is 
from one
of my wargame friends who was  flying a recon copter at Fort Sill and I
suspect he was at the Gulf war). The estimates I heard at the time was 
that Sadam
could contest the air over his forces for at least 2 to 3 weeks after he

invaded
Kuwait.

>
>sure if they were in inventory by '81.  Replaced
>UH-1s).  Since the LAV can't be pushed out the back of
>a C-130 with a parachute, the 82nd wouldn't have had
>'em.  They aren't anywhere on the list to recieve
>
So the M551 Sheridan  can be pushed out of a C130. I think they tried
that
once but it took a couple of weeks to fix it ( the Sheridan that is). In

desert
storm they reassigned the armored bn. to the division and it was
equipped
with Sheridens.

The armored bn. was supposed to receive the "light tank" but the program
went to the same way as the  Army LAV. I guess they solved the problem
by removing the armored bn. from the division.

>
>these Strykers.  3/2, 3/25th are the first two
>brigades to convert.  They announced the next two,
>2ACR is one of them but I don't recall the other.
>
>
> 
>
>>The basic question I still have is what are
>>advantages that the this APC
>>at $2 million per copy compared to a LAV25 which is
>>now 15 years
>>old and a fraction of the cost. If 200 are lost in
>>combat is there enough
>>in reserve to replace them or do we strip the units
>>to the rear.
>>
>
>Uh, first we aren't planning to loose 200 (A brigade's
>worth) of them.  If we do, we won't have the troops to
>
Let see. If  1 or 2 of the Navy transports are sunk or badly damaged 
that should
easily cost us 200+. If you say it is unlikely then tell that to crew of

the British
Type 42 destroyer  HMS Nottingham who "ran aground" (yes it is CNN and I
assume the ship had GPS) off Australia. Guess what, this would turn 
mechinized
infantry into motorized infantry (borrow the trucks from the locals).

>
>man the rebuilt brigade without stripping the units in
>the rear.
>
>Second, a LAV-25 carrys fewer than 9 troops and has
>less armor than the specification calls for.  You were
>whining about the Bradley's troop carrying capacity,
>the LAV-25 has the same capacity.
>
With costs of 1/3 of the Bradley, fuel efficiency that was twice as good

as the
Bradley and the highest reliably of any of the US APCs the LAV25 can
hold
its own. The Marines have 2 LAV25s for each squad and  even support,
medical and supply versions of the vehicle. The lighter armor was more 
due to
the Marine requirement that the LAV25 be able to swim on to the landing 
beach
(I wonder how well the Stryker can swim).

If you don't bite off my head if my count is off there is 135+ LAV25&
variants per Marine light armored battalion (I have 1 battalion in 1/300
scale). Due to it's cost the Bradley never did come out with all of the 
variants
it needed in it's battalion (I have a battalion of Bradleys in 1/300 
scale too).
As a side issue I have most battalions (in 1/300 scale in 1 to 1) of the
US,
Russian, German and British armies both regular and reserve (if it would
fight in Europe). I stopped collecting modern in about 1993 when a
Europian
war became unlikely and I went over to SciFi in 1/300 scale in a big
way..

Yes I do have Blackhawks and UH-1 and Cobra'a in 1/300 scale as well
as copters of most of the other powers mentioned above up to 1993.

>
>
>I mentioned this before.
> 
>
>> The only thing that can be assumed in a modern war
>>is that with the short
>>duration of the was (direct combat as opposed to
>>gorilla war) what you start
>>the war with is what you will end it with.
>>
>
>Which doesn't leave much time to be rebuilding
>destroyed brigades.
>
>John
>
The question is academic. The Democrats are screaming budget deficit
and the news media is screaming about $4 billion needed for airport
security so I suspect that improving conventional forces is DOA for
the foreseeable future and the money will go for special forces and
specialized units (10th Mountain division for example).

When the Russian threat was greatest the Abrams MBT, Bradley APC
and the TACFIRE FD(it does work fantastic but what a waste of time
to get it). Without a ground threat I suspect that the Army will delay
entry of any new vehicles till the next generation of APCs or another
ground threat pops up.

 If you don't mind the heresy I think we do not now need a new
APC but would be better off spending the money training the units
with what they have got. The peace dividend has cost the Army
much of it's readiness and as Sadam learned trained soldiers with
good equipment beat untrained soldiers with lots of equipment.

Scott Siebold