Re: Chinook Down!

>LOL- why was not the  SAS dewd carrying his E-tool?

Because we, the Australian Army, screwed up. Next time, we know
better.(BTW
think of these guys as LRRPS rather than ninja-suit commandos. They're
more
likely to carry a laser designator and air-frequency radio than an MP-5
and
gasmask).

>i am  pretty sure there  were	enough problems  among wonderful  folks
>of all nationalities involved in the  operation to be shared out
>equally.

Oh, Roger that. No question.

I'm somewhat perturbed by the general reaction on the list to the
article. ie
Taking it personally.

It's obvious that the original article's slanted to be from an
"Australian Perspective"
- but no more so than the majority of US-slanted reports, which are,
after all,
for a US audience. "Slant" is probably the wrong word - it's a matter of
emphasis.
The BBC (for example) although probably the most unbiased source in the
world
tends to give more detail to the exploits of UK troops, for the same
reason
- it's aimed primarily at a UK audience. Anyway, it might give a glimpse
to
USAians of the type of thing we have to wade through when looking
through many
US after-action reports. Some people just accept it as one of those
things,
some people see it as a sign of uniquely US arrogance. They're wrong: it
may
be arrogance (I think it's just human nature), but if so, every 
nationality
is guilty of it. Even Australians :-) 

Anyway, I'm more concerned about "lessons learnt". I don't care who had
the
Charlie Foxtrot, the point is to LEARN from it, and not make the same
mistakes
again. At least one American life was lost due to lessons not having
been learnt
from Russki experiences. Ouch. Letters home. Body bags. A good mate
lost, because
of a systemic screwup. The system - rather than any individual or group
of individuals
- failed. Next time we know better, OR BLOODY WELL SHOULD DO.

Some Lessons learnt:

Learn from past lessons, and analyse Lesson learnt.

Comms gear problem - the use of Runners to take messages is probably
always
going to be a feature of combat, when things go wrong, due to terrain,
enemy
jamming etc.

Massive Firepower a la B-52 or Ortillery is not always totally effective
vs
dug-in troops. Helos or light Gravtanks take damage and must go home to
lick
wounds, but are grossly effective while they're around. And nothing, but
nothing,
beats an AC-130 on call when things get down and dirty.

"When Shits are Trumps, your training takes over."
I'm sure the same thing was said in Latin 2000 years ago, and Egyptian
2000
years before that. But well worth repeating as a pithy quote.

Entrenching tools should be moved up in the list of priorities when
considering
the combat load. Especially when operating as a combat rather than
observe-and-avoid
force, and when the terrain is suitable for digging (most unusual
conditions
for the SAS, but they happen, as here.)

Inter-allied co-operation works: Australian troops down to the level of
PFC-equivalent
can and have successfully called down massive fire support within 100s
and even
10s of metres from friendlies. Being fair, said troops by doctrine
specifically
are trained to a similar type of thing - hide on a mountain/in a
jungle/lost
in the desert somewhere behind enemy lines and call in fire on enemy
convoys,