Fw: Port Arthur/Tsushima

Comments from a friend of mine who's a naval history buff:

> Well, yes.  No doubt the Russians were not as incompetent as painted
by
> popular history.  The circumnavigation (of Asia, if not the globe) in
> short-ranged coal-burning vessels was a spectacular achievement.  But
I
> seriously question the assertion that:
>
> "It made the US progression through the Pacific and the Normandy
landings
in
> WW2 look amateurishly inefficient."
>
> Both those efforts were frankly on a vastly larger and more complex
scale.
> And the distances in the Pacific offensive, although not as long in
one
> single leg as the Russian effort, were much greater if you add all the
> shipping and invasion routes involved in the whole thing, and the
objective
> (total warfare to defeat the Empire, as against trying to run into a
port,
> with no expectation of conquest) was MUCH more daunting.  Also,
regarding
> "inefficient", one might note that both the American efforts were
successes.
> Failure--even well-organized and smoothly-run  failure--is seldom
graced
> with the term "efficient".
>
> Personally I doubt the early death of the Russian leader was
especially
> important, or the condition of the Russian fleet itself.  I generally
have
> concluded that the condition of the Russian strategy was to blame.
>
> Tshushima Strait was one of those revolutionary battles in which new
> technologies are used by innovative minds in ways unforeseen by one
side.
> Most of these battles are gruesomely one-sided.  Cold Harbor (riflemen
in
> dispersed entrenchments can still concentrate their fire), Blitzkrieg
> (air-supported armor can pierce a front and throw armies into rapid
> retreat), Trafalgar (breaking the line from windward), the Swiss pike
> massacres (steady infantry packs more punch per square yard than any
> cavalry), and their like are usually massacres at least partly because
one
> side is does not foresee or adapt to changed circumstances and is
caught
> with its metaphorical pants down.
>
> The standard theory of the day was that battleships would win with a
"storm
> of shells" produced by their many quick-firing secondary batteries,
> supplemented but not superseded by their much larger but vastly fewer
main
> guns.  The main guns were understood to be hard-hitting, but their
throw
> range was believed to far exceed the range at which they could
effectively
> hit anything (about the same range as the secondary batteries).
>
> The Japanese, partly through their observation of the Royal Navy, had
become
> convinced that main gunnery could be made effective through improved
> technique (centralized fire control, "timing" the salvo to the wave
crests),
> new technology ("gunnery clock" calculators, telephonic communication
with
> better-placed observers, and better optics), and ceaseless exercise. 
They
> then worked at these improvements.  Their idea was to rapidly and
accurately
> deliver main-gun ordnance at ranges far outside an enemy's secondary
> batteries, before an enemy was even expecting to engage.  And to
deliver
> masses of this fire, not just a few shells.  No one else had
accomplished
> this, but their expectations were annihilatory from the start, like
Nelson
> at Trafalgar; whereas the Russians were basically hoping to avoid a
> confrontation or make a fighting withdrawal.
>
> Basically, I am placing the "blame" for Tsushima on the Japanese
approach,
> not Russian incompetence.  Other navies of the day (British or
American)
> would have fared much better perhaps, but all would have been
surprised
and
> badly beaten.  Only seven years before (1898), the American watchword
had
> been "You may fire when ready, Gridley."  Well, the Japanese would
have
been
> delivering rounds on target long before Gridley would have been ready.
>
> Even the Japanese themselves might have lost had the same methods been
used
> against them; they were expecting the Russians to behave in a certain
way
> and something different might have changed the outcome.
>
> When I say "delivering rounds on target", understand that of course by
> civilian standards a lot of missing took place for every shot that
hit,
but
> the job still got done.
>
> On a side note, the story of the "torpedo boat" in the English
channel,
> where the Russians got bad PR for firing at nearby vessels, contrasts
> ironically with the ironclad self control of the USS Cole's gunners. 
Both
> navies had intelligence reports of hostiles in the area.  Which was
the
more
> competent?