Re: Discussion topic - rewriting (future) history....?

G'day,

I'd say my one and only real bugbear about the futureverse is that the
IF and NI have to be so focused at each other's throats. Freed from such
close quarters you could imagine a diversification of tensions. This is
a problem I have with many "future histories" across many different
fiction sources where long term combatants on Earth transfer without
pause into space. I know that there are plenty of cases where there have
been centuries of history between two "nations" but geography plays a
decent part to that. 

However, this is not a reason to change anything though because there is
enormous scope to paint the existing timeline in a vast number of ways.
As a bit of fun years back I wrote a version up with a few more details
that caste a different light to the commonly held view on the same
events. I won't bother reposting here as it raised a few hackles at the
time, but it was meant to be one example of the many many ways you can
caste the current GZGverse timeline. In all I think that's a strength.
In fact a geopolitical adviser friend of mine was quite intrigued to
hear it was written when it was, given things have panned out since. He
was very interested in it.

A more moderate whinge is I'm coming to the end of my Mars timeline of
stories (I've just about kicked the KV back off Mars... I hope to finish
that this summer) so it'd be nice to know how the humans eventually
kicked the KV butt in total (or whether the KV just dwindled away for
their own reasons like the Mongol horde) so I don't end up too off base
;)

Lets start the second Xeno war! ;)

Beth

P.S. In case anyone is interested here are two example geopolitical
sketches/scenarios drawn up recently by some advisers as context for
some modelling work Im doing in Australia. This is pretty indicative of
the kind of broad brush strokes used in that realm, so you can see Jon
isn't too far off the mark in the way he does thing

>>>> WATER CRISIS IN SE ASIA <<<<<<<

Water demand is growing fast across Asia, as large populations there
continue to grow, both in terms of population numbers, but also via
industrial expansion. This could potentially lead to tension as China is
already water poor, with changes in the regional climate contracting the
water supply (from Himalayan meltwater and monsoons) and making it more
variable. Chinas desire for control of its water supply is evident in
the many water redirection plans and the buffering infrastructure that
have been built over the last 2000 years (the Grand Canal project began
in 16BC). China controls the headwaters of many of the major rivers
which feed India, Bangladesh, and SE Asia. This means that Chinese
decisions have significant potential to shape stability in the region.

Possibly the best outcome for the region is if all the nations in the
region agree to basin wide sharing and allocation of water, while
simultaneously becoming more efficient in their use of water (e.g. by
adapting their agriculture to use less water). The more likely business
as usual trajectory is that China continues to steadily divert more
water from SE Asia into water poor regions of China, though they would
likely refrain from redirecting waters destined for the sub-continent
for diplomatic and security reasons (as India is perhaps too big an
enemy to make and Pakistan is currently too good a friend). While the
impacted SE Asian nations could moderate the effects of reduced water
availability by increasing efficiency and adapting industrial practices
it is still likely to increase tenions (especially with Vietnam). The
worst outcome would come if China aggressively diverted water from all
the headwaters to its parched east. This would lead to significant
tensions between China and both India and Vietnam. Any war with India
over water could have devastating implications, including the
possibility of a nuclear exchange. Tension of this kind would not only
be devastating for those directly involved, but the ensuing instability
would affects Australias trade and border security (massively increasing
people movement and illegal immigration pressures) as well as leading to
changed trade conditions and productivity.

>>>> POTENTIAL UNIFICATION OF THE MUSLIM WORLD <<<<<<<<<<

As seen in the tumultuous activities of 2010-2011 there are many
pressures driving for change in middle eastern and African nations,
including fast growing populations with millions of unemployed youth
(and education gaps), a rejection of modernism and the West (which has
been tainted by its support for local dictators). This has provided an
opportunity for many different unifying concepts to be put forward, some
democratic, some based on the religious ideal of the caliphate and many
antithetical to western powers. At present it is unclear what form of
government will ultimately emerge from the upheavals of the Arab Spring.
Democratic movements are only one faction represented in the
revolutions, with the Muslim Brotherhood (and similar organisations)
typically much better organised than the democrats and on-going tension
and struggle between Shia and Sunni interests. It is possible that a
single unifying form of rule could extend from Maghreb, to the Middle
East, Pakistan and Indonesia in the east and the Sub-Sahara (e.g.
Nigeria etc) in the south. The presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan
(and potential weapons programs in Iran) could exacerbate nervousness of
nations like Israel regarding the outcome of the revolutions. At one
extreme Israel and the USA may take decisive (and early) action to
neutralize the nuclear threat, while simultaneously preventing
accommodation between Shia and Sunni interests and supporting key oil
producing Arab states so that they do not fall into any caliphate. At
the other extreme is the scenario where most Muslim states come together
in the caliphate, with a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran
disrupting global oil production; anti-Muslim sentiment leading to
pre-emptive suppression of Muslim minorities in China, Russia and
Europe. The later situation could degrade further if it leads to
military conflict; for instance, if Pakistan collapses the USA may feel
compelled to take surgical action to secure the Pakistanis nuclear
stockpile, potentially ending in a standoff with India if they also
attempt to secure Pakistans stockpile, the resulting posturing could see
India take more territory in Kashmir, securing territory in Afghanistan
and ending up in a further stand-off with China (who may feel compelled
to support Pakistan and enter Afghanistan against India). A more middle
of the road business as usual scenario is that not all Muslim states
fall and only a caliphate of sorts forms, which does not include all of
the key oil producers, Israel my still take out Iranian nuclear
facilities and Pakistan may still suffer at least partial collapse,
particularly in the north where large bandit regions of Taliban may
form. However, it would be a much more heterogeneous outcome than
envisaged for either of the other, more extreme, scenarios.