RE: Headgear/[SG2] Weapons...

Ryan wrote:

>photo's of British Troops in the Southern areas
>wearing soft berets and 'belt order'. Could this
>attitude from the troops on the way up to those
>in command make a difference in some areas?

>From what I understand, once the "war" was over and the "occupation"
began
the UK command ordered the troops on the ground to replace their helmets
with Berets.

To be honest the Brits do seem to have taken a lot less casualties from
guerrila attacks and to get on better with the locals than the US forces
are. However, though the Berret and general demeanor does help the
Brits,
they are operating in the Basra region and the ethnic mix there
(predominantly Shi'it I think, not Sunni...?) was opposed to the Ba'ath
regime and therefore will look on their "conquerors" somewhat more
kindly
than in the centre and North where the Americans are. The US forces are
operating in and around Saddams and the Ba'ath regime's main stomping
ground
so I can see why they would want to project a more beligerent stance in
their appearance. I suppose it is down to the US command in the area to
decide if and when the troops there will be able to switch to a more
friendly look, which could help (I stress could, obviously John has an
infinetly greater insight on local attitudes to US troops there than I
do)
to swing more local support their way (see below for how this can
occur).

Historicaly, since WW2 the British have had huge amounts of
"peacekeeping
experience", or to put it more accurateley "urban conflict" from Ireland
to
the Balkans, this coupled with a lack of resources in terms of high tech
systems or forepower means that we have had to rely much more on the
troops
on the gound to deal with situations without automatically calling
heavier
fire support (though there have been times when this would have been
bloood
useful). The differing attitudes between US and Brit forces on how to
operate on hostile streets is the product of both forces differing
experiences since WW2, and both sides can point to numerous examples to
say
their way is right. The reality is both concepts have their strengths
and
weakness and will vary with success according to the particulars of each
individual situation. I just hope that ALL allied troops in Iraq get the
drop done and get home safley.

Imre wrote:

>Malaya was an interesting case, the insurgency was centered on an
ethnic
>minority.  I read a book on it many years ago, but I don't remember
very
>much.	I think it would be very interesting to find/or do a study
comparing
>and contrasting US and UK counter-insurgency techniques in the 20th
century.

>From what I can gather the British used special forces operating in the
field with local guides to hunt down enemy positions for observation or
"neutralisation". The British followed a hearts and minds policy in both
conflicts, supplying villages with food and offering protection to them,
and
never treating villagers and the locals as targets. This polarised areas
with the guerillas starting to attack the local villages in turn forcing
the
locals further into the British camp, who in turn recieved better
intelligence on enemy operations. I don't know how long Malaya took to
sort
out but the Brits were in Burma from 1963 to 67 when the Indonesians
decided
enough was enough and gave up. As for Brits interacting with the locals,
a
recent documentary over here (UK) on the SAS had three Burmese guides
recruited from a head hunter tribe describe how certain members of the
SAS
also indulged in a spot of head hunting amongst the Indonesian
guerillas.
Still, seemed to impress the locals and to keep them on side.

A quick question on an historical note; in 1950's Malaya Brit forces
made
use of helicopters in jungle environments, is this amongst the first
examples of this operational concept in a conflict environment?

Regards,

Matt Tope