Re: MURPHY AT WAR

On Mon, 20 May 2002 18:24:00 -0500 (CDT), DAWGFACE47@webtv.net wrote:

>I  am curious. just how may different things can the list come up with
>that  would be useful for "shit happens!" events during  an operations
>or an acutaul fight  between armed  combatants;

Well, from history:

1. Commander keeps overall plan to himself and immediate staff officers.
Security is so tight that he gets the jump on the enemy and completely
out
maneuvers them. However, part of his plan called for aggressive
movements by a
subordinate, who didn't know exactly what the plan was. Subordinate
interprets
orders as conservatively as possible and doesn't launch timely assault
to pin
the enemy. As a result, reinforcements head to the other sector to meet
the
main assault force when they should have been pinned in place.

2. Commander has trouble feeding his troops. Sends off 1/3 of force to
forage.
Other parts of the force are spread out so as not to be as big a burden
on one
local area. He has contempt for the opposing commander. He mistakes the
intended target of a raiding party and inadvertently clears recce units
away
from the enemy's intended march route. As a result, enemy approaches him
with
a massive assault force in two pincers, both crossing a river at
different
points, and with the commander unsure of which pincer is the true
threat. The
contemptable enemy commander has gotten the better of the headstrong
defender.

3. New reconnaissance technology is being used. Civilian contractors and
military trainees both use the device. Civilian contractors are unable
to
interpret the intelligence as effectively, when they use the device, as
military personnel. As such, worth of the device is somewhat
compromised.
(Historically, the "device" was a hydrogen balloon.)

4. Communications gear fouls up. Commander gets garbled messages. He
thinks
one of his units is on the north side of a river when they have actually
crossed over and made a beachhead on the south side of the river. Gives
orders
to this unit assuming they are tardy and still on the other side of the
river.

5. Enemy force is seen heading away from positions. Units in that sector
harass the rear guard. Most officers believe the enemy is retreating, as
this
was to be expected due to the efforts of a major raiding party. In
truth, the
"retreating" force is actually making a major flank attack.

6. Commander feels right flank is vulnerable. He sends orders to a
portion of
the force in another sector and across a river to move onto the right
flank.
Message sent via courier through safe terrain due to problems with a new
communications system. Courier still takes, for some reason never
determined,
3 hours to travel 5 miles. As a result, reinforcements have to cross the
river
in daylight instead of at night, and under fire! Movement to reinforce
flank
is greatly (and, as it turns out, tragically) delayed.

7. Right flank is up against "impassable" terrain (in this case, thick
woods).
Enemy movement in front of them is dismissed by unit commanders as recce
units. Unit commander pays lip service to direct order to reinforce his
right
flank. Commander one level down in the echelon, who is commanding the
extreme
right flank of the unit, is intoxicated on "pain medicines"
(historically, he
was drunk) due to an injury suffered earlier. "Recce units" are actually
part
of a major outflanking maneuver by the enemy. Impassable terrain isn't.
Reinforcing unit that was supposed to move in to support right flank was
delayed due to communication foul up and doesn't arrive in time.

8. Outflanking maneuver plans to hit the idle defender on the far flank.
However, there is only a vague idea of where the enemy is located. When
they
come to the jumping off point for the outflanking maneuver, they
discover that
the enemy is further to the right than expected. If they jump off from
here,
they will hit the enemy obliquely. It would be better to move around
further
to the right and hit them full in the side, but this will cost precious
time.
What should the unit do? (Historically, the assaulting force was moved,
resulting in a surprise flank attack. The attack had to go off at
sundown. As
a result, the attack started to lose cohesion just as it got dark.)

9. An outflanking attack is incredibly successful, but is starting to
peter
out. Commander goes on unnecessary recce due to impatience. He, and next
level
down commander who is with him, assumes the other warned nearby units of
their
presence. Shots are fired, the commanders turn back and are hit with
friendly
fire. Both commanders are wounded. Command falls to a ranking, well
known and
well liked officer who, however, is not from the same branch of the
service!
He also doesn't know the previous commander's plans because the previous
commander keeps everything to himself. He halts attack due to night
fall,
resulting in a dug in enemy that needs to be assaulted the following
morning.

10. Commander goes on the tactical defensive, waiting for a raiding
party that
was given the order to "fight, fight, fight!" and to cut the enemy
supply
lines. Thus, the commander gives up the initiative. Whole campaign
hinges on
the supply lines cut and the enemy to their front being forced to
retreat.
Supply lines are never cut due to the incompetence of the raiding
party's
commander.

11. Unit holds a salient. Overall commander orders the unit to pull out
of the
salient before it is surrounded. Salient, however, turns out to be an
excellent and natural "artillery park". As a result, the enemy ends up
with
high ground and an advantage in counter battery and anti-infantry fire.

12. Unit is being heavily assaulted. Commander is moving units around
the
battlefield very skillfully. He has two large units uncommitted just as
the
enemy commits the last of his reserves. At that precise moment, when his
men
are calling for reinforcements and the crisis point of the battle is
reached,
the commander is wounded. Command _should_ be transferred to second in
command, but chief of staff is coordinating things in another sector.
Acting
chief of staff is a politically appointed flunky that has been forced on
the
commander by his superior. Flunky decides not to decide. Commander wakes
up
and appears okay, but is in fact stunned and suffering the effects of a
major
concussion. He does eventually relinquish command himself, but only
after one
fateful hour goes by. When he does, he is not in complete control of his
faculties. He appears confused. He hands over command, but with the
proviso
that the army withdraw. Does the second in command take over and ignore
this
order, or does he accept what is obviously a bad decision on his
commander's
part? (Historically, the second in command takes over and carries out
the
erroneous order.)

13. Unit is ordered to move forward and take a dug in position on a
ridge. Due
to the difficulty involved, and the commander's conservative style,
coupled to
being unsure of what is expected of him and erroneous orders stemming
from
garbled communications, the commander takes his time ordering the
assault. The
force defending the position is very small. As he prepares to assault,
the
position is reinforced, heavily. The opposing force is increased one
echelon!
(Historically, the position was defended by a brigade, but by the time
the
attack took place it was up to a reinforced division.)

14. Unit is defending high ground on the left that slopes to flatter
wooded
ground with entrenchments on the right. The high ground is extremely
defensible and the sight of a bloody assault months earlier. Commander
feels
the flatter area is the likely target. He reinforces the flatter area.
The
opposing commander, though, makes the "stupid" mistake of assaulting the
high
ground again. This would lead to another bloodbath, but the defenders
have out
thought themselves and left the high ground less protected than it
should be.
The assaulting force now has a real chance to take the position.

15. Unit takes the aforementioned high ground. However, it halts to move
fresh
units to the front of the column before advancing. This gives the enemy
time
to put up a delaying force. The assaulting unit moves forward over a
series of
low ridges. In front is a large clearing in the woods. Enemy unit holds
a
couple of defensible structures at the mouth of the clearing, and the
woods at
the end of the clearing. Unknown to the assaulting force, another three
units
the same size as the defending unit have moved up in reinforcement and
are now
hiding in the woods. The assault becomes an ambush.

16. Unit pulls back after ambush and anchors itself against a river
crossing.
Commander of the unit decides to withdraw across the river and tells
overall
commander. A friend and fellow officer suggests that this should be the
decision of the overall commander, and so he sends a message stating
that he
will hold in position until further orders. This second message is
supposed to
supercede the first one, but both are sent about 10 minutes apart.
Overall
commander gets the unit commander's message saying he is pulling back
across
the river, and so he decides to make a general withdrawal. He sends a
message
to the unit commander to pull out. Minutes later he receives the second
message from the unit commander (this is well before withdrawal order
could
reach the unit commander). Overall commander realizes he still has a
chance if
he holds the river crossing. He tells the unit commander to hold in
place, and
that reinforcements are on the way. The overall commander receives the
two
messages from his subordinate 20 minutes apart. The unit commander
receives
the two messages from his superior (the first saying to withdraw, the
second
saying to hold in place) some 90 minutes apart, due to communication
gear foul
ups. By the time the second message -- the one ordering him to sit in
place --
arrives, the unit has already pulled out and the enemy is moving into
the
vacated position.

All of these are from one single campaign during the American Civil War.
(An
old fashioned Marvel Comics "No Prize" for the first person to guess the
campaign.) Not all of them are immediately applicable to modern combat,
but
all of them can be used for a source of scenarios. Take number 16 for
example.
What if the communication to pull out is given and the force starts to
withdraw, and _then_ the communication to stay is given a turn or two
later?
Historically the enemy had spent itself and was not heavily harassing
the
withdrawing unit. What if the unit was withdrawing under fire and then
got the
order to turn around and stay? It would make a very interesting
scenario.

Allan Goodall		       agoodall@hyperbear.com
http://www.hyperbear.com

"At long last, the earthy soil of the typical, 
unimaginable mortician was revealed!"