Re: data saturation on in future combat
From: jatkins6@i... (John Atkinson)
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 1998 13:27:14 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Re: data saturation on in future combat
You wrote:
>Mikko brings up an excellent point that having all this sensor data
does >not bring you automatic "situational awareness". This is purely
my >opinion, but I believe that with all this newfangled sensor
equipment >ever for today (esp. JSTARs and the digital battlefield
project), you >have battalion, brigade, and division commanders, that
have so much data >at their finger tips, that most of them get bogged
down telling this or >that company commander what he should be doing to
fight his own company >instead of concentrating on their appropriate
level of command. This was >a big problem in Desert Storm.
Quite frankly, there are a number of trends leading to this. First,
this trend stems from two issues. A commander is 100% liable for the
behavior of ALL of his subordinates. Second, the officer evaluation
process in the US Army requires a 0 defect mentality--any mistake no
matter how minor, will wipe out the entire chain of command's careers.
Hence the leadership gets used to micromanaging their junior leaders in
peace time and this carries out to a combat environment. The mid-level
and senior officers don't trust their junior officers and men to do
their damn jobs. My personal feeling is that if you trust the man to
do his job, then let him do it without jogging his elbow. If not,
relieve him NOW and get someone who you can trust.
Possible solutions--first, you need to have people who have lived their
entire careers with this sort of data flow. It's unsurprising 1990s
colonels and lieutenant colonels have difficulty with the flood of
computor data. Remember, these guys likely got their commisions 20
years ago. The Army (hell, the World) has changed dramatically since
they were 2LTs. Next there needs to be a doctrine dealing with this
increased level of data flow. As far as I know the Army does not have
a data flow doctrine per se, and what doctrine their is on the role of
staff work in weeding out the chaff from the wheat is probably
WWII-era. This is being worked on. You'll also find expert computor
systems (Central in Hammer's Slammers) which can handle the
housekeeping and minor details. Some scout gets lost? Let the
computor handle it rather than the Batallion Commander dealing with it
personally as I have read of occouring in Force XXI exercises.
Aircraft incoming? You don't need a staff to deal with it, you need a
computor coordinating the air defense network and automatically yelling
to aerospace units for air cover. Your artillery, air defense, chemmo,
and some other staff officers may be replaced by little black boxes.
You will also have (at least in my image of colonial warfare in the
XXIInd century) much smaller forces operating across larger areas
during the stages of conventional mechanized conflict (force ratios for
insurgency/counter-insurgency will be something else entirely). So it
will not be unusual for a Company Team (the normal level of
organization for most 'high tech' Dirtside II games I play--I can put
out 15,000 point Company Teams if I go for Clibanophoroi. I sometimes
go up the the short batallion size) to have a slice of Batallion and
brigade level assets--perhaps even troops attached down from division.
>In special operations, we're there has always been a lot more sensor
and >state of the art communications gear available, commanders have
long had >to deal with these problems. Especially on mission the high
priority >where you could have commanders of the highest level plugged
into the >net. It's extremely frustrating. I can tell you that on some
missions it >was a matter of SOP to not report data or report erroneous
data in >particular regarding our exact where abouts. (Though a certain
amount of >that goes back to mistrusting the security of the data
link). Especially >on long missions dealing with other countries we had
to balance what's >right with what our commanders wanted us to do so
they would stay out of >hot water with their uppers. So most teams
failed to report a lot of >their activities in order that no one would
monkey with them.
I imagine 'misread' grid coordinates, 'interference', 'static', and
'radio malfunctions' will also play a part in keeping Captain
Thus-and-So free from nosy interference from higher HQs which may be
sveral hundred (or hundred thousand) miles away.
>pesky infantry tank killer teams trying to ambush them. He starts
>flooding the company comanders with orders on how to fight his
company. >Something gets ignored. The company commander has to pull his
mind off >the fight to argue with the BC. Something is missed, and
people get >killed. This happens al lot today, there's no reason why it
won't happen >in the future with even greater data saturation.
First, in such a case in the Nea Rhomaioi Army the Company Commander
would be cashiered for not turning off his radio and fighting his
company, and the BC would be cashiered for gross incompetence. :) The
only real solution would be to create a mentality of 'damnit, I'm not
the man on the ground so I'm not going to interfere' that we saw in
Washington during Desert Storm. The SecDef, JCS, and NCA refused to
get involved in a lot of decisions that they got involved in during
Vietnam for precisely that reason. It was unfortunate that noone
in-theater took a lesson from that and stayed out of decisions too far
below their link in the chain of command. Patton once said that a
commander should issue orders one level down and his maps should not
show the location of any unit more than two levels down. A division
commander should order around his brigades and independant batallions,
and show batallions of brigades and companies of divisional batallions
on his main maps.
John M. Atkinson